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FOREWORD 
The  present report  was  drawn  up  in the  first six months  of 1977  b,y  the 
forecasting experts of the  Stu~ Group  for Medium-term  Economic  Assessments, 
set up  by  the  Commission. 
"The  task of this Study  G~oup is to analyze, in collaboration with the  Commission 
services,  economic  developments in the  Community  and the  international environ-
ment,  to make  and regularly update  medium-term projections,  and  to examine 
connected problems in the  area of statistics and economic  model  building. 
With  a  view to preparing guidelines for economic  policy the  Group  sets out 
the  conditions for the  achievement  of the  projections." 
This work  is mainly used as background to the  elaboration of the Medium-term 
Economic  Policy Programmes  and the updating of the economic  policy guidelines 
to assure  a  better convergence  of economic  policy and development  in the 
Community.* 
The  members  of the  Study  Group  take  part in the  work  as  independent experts. 
The  assessments contained in the  report  do  not  therefore  commit  either the 
Commission  or the  Governmental  institutions of the member  countries;  they 
have  been formulated from  a  Community  point of view and the  report  as a  whole 
has  been approved  by the  forecasting experts of the  Study  Group,  even if it 
does not reflect in ever,y detail the  opinions of each member. 
This report is accompanied  b,y  an  annex which  contains the graphs  and tables 
on  which the report was  baaed. 
*  ~ Council Decision of  18  Feburary 1974 concerning the  achievement  of a  high 
degree  of convergence  of the  economic  policy of the member  states of the 
European Economic  Gomnruni ty  (7 4/120/EEG),  notably articles 2  and 6.  . 
- Co1mc.il  Directive  of 18 February 1974 concerning stability,  growth and full 
employment  in the  Community  (7 4/121/EEG) ,, notably article  4. - IV  - n/236/3/77-E 
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SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS  PRESENTED  BY  THE  CHAIR.~AN OF  THE  GROUP 
The  work  of the  Stu~ Group  leads to the  following conclusions: 
- Given  the  possible  growth of productive  potential and the  degree  of 
capacity utilisation in the  base year 1975,  when  the  economic  situation 
was  particularly depressed,  a  medium-term  growth rate  of over  5%  p.a. up  to 
1980  would  be  possible for the  Community  ( cf. Fourth Programme). 
- In order to reduce  unemployment,  a  growth rate  of more  than  4.5%  p.a. 
would  be  required.  (Productivity per man 7ear grows  at about  4%  p.a., 
the  working population grows at nearly 1/2% p.a.) 
- At  present,  because  of a  number  of  impediments to the  growth of demand, 
it is to  be  feared that a  medium  term  growth rate  of only  3  1/2%  p.a. 
will be  achieved unless additional measures are  taken. 
These  developments mean  that future  growth  of output  could be  lower than 
the  growth of productivity,  so  that unemployment  would  continue  on  a 
rising trend. 
The  impedimenta to growth have  the  following main  causes: 
- The  persistence  of high inflation rates and  pronounced balance  of 
payments disequilibria induces  the  countries most  affected to follow 
restrictive economic policies. 
- The  fear of a  new  bout  of inflation,  and  also certain specific problems 
in the  area of public finance,  ·prev~nts the  stronger countries 
·from  pursuing:deliberate expansionar.y policies. 
-The continuing disequilibria in world economic relations,  with the 
persistent large  surplus of  the  OPEC  countries and the  deterioration 
of the  position of the  oil-importing developing countries,  are  a 
source  of additional international difficulties. 
- The  growth of investment  remains  sluggish due  to too  low a  rate  of 
capacity utilisation while  in some  countries difficulties have  been 
put in the ~  of both public and private  investment projects by 
certain pressure  groups  (notably in the  areas of energy and protection 
of the  environment). 
'  I • 
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It thus becomes  more  and more  apparent that the  achievement  of the 
objectives of the  Fourth Programme  is much  more  difficult than it 
seemed  a  year ago.  However,  it i~ still not  impossible,  even if 
it has to be  delayed.  The  Study Group  has set out,  at the end of 
its report,  conditions which will enable  the  economy  to develop 
in the  desired direction  :  they can be  set out  round the  following 
themes: 
(1)  Theeradication of inflationar,y expectations remains  a  vital 
objective of economic  policy,  as long as current  behaviour  and 
economic  structures have  not  been sufficiently modified. 
(2)  However  the  countries which are  in the  most  favourable  situation 
as regards  the  balance  of payments and inflation must  continue, 
as far as possible,  to lead growth inside  the  Community; 
the  countries which  have  not yet been able  to reduce  their 
inflation rate  sufficiently must  do  their best  to bring the 
growth of costs and prices quickly under control  so that they · 
too  can in due  course  do  more  to sustain growth.  The  time  re-
maining in which to bring about  this desirable ~ic  process 
is extremely short. 
(3)  The  countries whose  balance  of payments  have  remained particularly 
adverse  should seek medium-term  finance  for their deficits rather 
than relying on  further  exchan~ rate  changes.  It is essential 
that the  vicious circle of devaluation,  inflation and distributional 
struggles be  broken. 
{4)  On  the  other hand those  countries which have  achieved equilibrium, 
or even a  surplus,  in their balance  of payments  must  aim for  a 
strong growth of real internal demand  and not  seek to run up 
unnecessar.y surpluses. 
{5)  Given the  persistence  of · a  large  OPEC  surplus,  the  Community 
as a  whole  should tolerate,  in the next  few years,  an external 
deficit,  while  in 1980  its current account  should move  towards 
equilibrium rather than the  large  surplus  shown  in the  projections 
of member  countries.  The  Community  would  thus help to solve  the 
balance  of payments  problem at world level,  while  the  demand 
management  measures  recommended  in the  previous paragraphs would 
lead to a  better distribution of the oil deficits inside the 
Community • -VIII- II/236/3/77-E 
(6)  In order that a  growth-sustaining policy does not  rekindle  inflation 
by accelerating the  growth  of money  incomes,  certain forms  of 
behaviour  must  change.  This change  may  require  some  strengthening 
of the  procedures by which the  social partners are  informed and 
consul  ted,  with the  aim  of showing the  links between the  growth 
of incomes,  costs and prices and the  resulting constraints on 
expansionar.y policy. Hence  the  information and the  debate  should 
also bear on  the  medium-term  outlook and policies for employment 
and,  in  some  countries,  on  the  inequality of incomes. 
(7)  The  present  outlook suggests that it is unlikely that  growth  in 
the  Community  will  be  led by extra-Community exports;  moreover 
intra-Community trade  can  only transmit  growth generated by  other 
policies. These  should rely mainly  on  the  stimulation of invest-
ment,  because  of its effect not  only  on  demand  but also partic-
ularly on  employment  creation and  the  long-term  improvement 
in the  competitiveness of the  Community.  In some  oases the  recover.y 
of investment itself depends  on  the ·growth  of demand.  This  could 
come  from  an acceleration of private  consumption,  which  would be 
compatible  with price stability if it was  brought  about  by  a 
reduction of household  savings or taxes.  Growth  could equally 
well be  · stimulated by increasing public  investment,  where 
programmes  have  been significantly reduced  in the  recession,  or 
where  there  is a  considerable  lack of public  equipment; 
it is thus desirable  that public sector deficits are not eliminated 
too quickly. 
{8)  Whatever progress is achieved in sustaining growth,  the  employment 
situation will remain difficult for several years;  a  strengthening 
of the  appropriate  accompanying employment  policy is thus 
indispensable. - 1  - II/236/3/77-E 
CHAPTER  I  'llJIE  .APPROACH 
In 1975  and 1976  the  Study  Group  on  Medium-term  Economic  Assessments,  in 
conjunction with the  Co~~~mission services,  examined  the  macroeconomic  outlook 
for the  Commtmity  for  the  period 1976-80  with a  view to preparing the  Fourth 
Medium-term  Economic  Policy Programme. 
The  starting point for this work  was  an analysis  of the  international economic 
outlook following the  rise  in the  price  of oil at the  end of 1973  and the 
world  recession of 1974/5.  AllO\iing for the uncertainties,  two  sets of 
assumptions about  the  development  of the  world economy  have  been adopted, 
of which the  chief characteristic is the  growth  rate  of world  imports 
(exclusive  of state trading countries)  of  ~2 %  p.a.  and.  8% - ~  ~ p.a. 
*  respectively (cf.  table  1).  As  regards inflation,  a  rate  of the  order of 7 - 8%  p.a. 
for the GDP  deflator of industrial  cormtries is assumed  in both cases.  This 
corresponds to  the  average  achieved in preceding years,  if the  particularly 
high rates of 1974  and 1975,  largely reflecting the effects of the  oil price 
rise,  are  taken out.  The  assumption that inflation would  also remain relatively 
high in the  low-growth  case  appears to be  justified in view of.the fact that the 
resulting slower growth  in living standards would  intensify the  struggle 
over the  distribution of  the national  income. 
At  the  end of 1975  two  projections for the  member  countries  (see  table  2) 
were  available  : 
a  low-growth variant  (outlook A :  3.3 %  growth  per year in the  Community's 
GDP  and a  high  growth variant  (outlook B  :  4.6  ·~growth per year). 
Given  these  forecasts,  the  low-growth variant was  considered  as  being 
socially and politically;intolerable,  mainly  because  of the  level  of 
unemployment  and the  little growth  in the  standard of living which it involved. 
*  For technical reasons the  tables are presented in the Annex  of the present report. - 2-
In effect,  the  slow growth  of this variant  would  not  only  lead to a  level  of 
unanployment  which  could reach 5i %  - 6-;Z-%  of the  working population  by  1980 
(see  diagram at  the  front  of this report),  but also to an  inadequate  growth 
in investment.  For this  reason.  growth prospects and the  return to full 
employment  would  be  compromised even during the  period 1980-85.  This  outlook A 
thus  signifies for the  Community  a  long period of under-employment  equilibrium 
without  resolving 'to  a:ny  extent the. problems  of inflation,  public finance  and resource 
allocation. 
The  Study Group  in making this  judgement  was  conscious  of the fact  that there 
was  a  danger of the  outlook in practice  taking this form  if it should prove 
impossible  to arrange  the  economic policy conditions necessary for the 
realization of a  more  optimistic outlook. 
In order to spell  out  the  conditions which  would  avoid  such a  development, 
the efforts of the  Group  were  turned towards  the  analysis of the  high-growth 
variant.  This was  considered as a  central hypothesis and even as a  minimum 
to  be  attained,  given the  objective  of full employment.  Even  so,  for certain 
countries this "optimistic" variant still left considerable  problems,  especially 
unemployment  and  inflation; for  others it seemed difficult to achieve. 
The  persistance  of difficulties in the  way  of full employment,  even in 
this variant  B,  has  led the  Study Group  to envisage  an even faster growth 
rate but at the  same  time  to demonstrate  the  problems  of convergence  in economic 
policies and trends between member  countries and the  problems  of adjustment 
of the  trend in incomes as well as relative costs and prices between member 
countries,  problems which  appeared difficult to solve;  the  persistent weakness 
of the  international monetary  system also appears as an additional  source 
of difficulty. - 3 - II/236/3/77-E 
The  nature  of the  problem  and  the  conditions for  success derived from  this 
outlook B (high growth  case)  directly influenced the  content  of the Fourth 
Programme.  The  present  document  can therefore  be  limited to recalling the 
main  points and giving certain of the  illustrative figures,  notably for 
the  Community,  which  could not  appear in the  text of the  Programme. 
The  quantitative  orientations of the  Programme  (outlook C - cf.  table  2)  are 
thus based on  the  nhigh"  variant  of the  Study  Group.  But  taking account  of the 
self-imposed objectives of the  countries,  certain  guidelines concerning 
growth  were  to be  formulated  in a  more  ambitious  way~ For  the  Community  as-a 
'whole,  the  Programme  sets a  minimum  tareet of  a  growth rate  in the  volume 
of GDP  of  4·5 to 5  vfo  per year for  the  period 1976-80  (see  table  2). 
In effect a  growth rate  of 5.1  -~ p.a. for example,  slightly exceeding this 
margin,  would  permit under certain conditions a  reduction b,y  half of the  level 
of unemployment  between 1976  and 1980  (cf.  outlook G'in the  diagram  at  the 
start of this report  and  line  5  of table  6). 
At  the  end of the  work  on  the  Fourth Programme,  the  Study  Group  undertook a  fuller 
analysis and updated the  projections which were  available  as at the  beginning 
of 1977.  With  a  growth  rate  of 4.3% per year for the  Community  over the 
period 1976-80,  this outlook D remains a· little below the  o·bjective  of 
the  Fourth Programme,  but is generally similar to the  optimistic variant of 
December  1975  (outlook B)  although the  growth rate is slightly  lo\~r. The 
presentation of the  medium-term  problems in the next  chapter is done  on  the 
basis of these,  generally more  recent,  projections  (see  chapter II of the 
present  document). 
The  nature of the projections  which  constitute Outlook  D needs  to be  spelled 
out:  for certain countries  (D,  I,  UK,  IRL)  the revised projections were  made 
early in 1977;  for the other five  countries it did not  appear possible  (in 
December  1976  and January 1977)  to change  the projections made  during 1976 
which  in certain cases  (notably France  a.nd  Belgium)  served tts  technical  bases 
in national programmes  or plans.  The  developments  since the presentation of 
the projections  in combination with the  lack of homogeneity  in the timing 
of the updating of the projections leads to a  too optimistic growth rate 
for the Community  but  does  not affect the main  conclusions  of the -4- II/236A/77-E 
present report;  in effect the  projections are  only an illustration,  more 
or less precise  depending on  the  country,  of a  general  set of medium-term 
problems  which,  today, seem  to  stand out  clearly. 
Bringing together the quantitative  guidelines of the  Fourth Programme  with 
the  short-term estimates  (1976  and 1977)  shows  up the  risks which  weigh  on 
the  achievement  of the  objectives of this Programme.  When  the first fore-
casts made  by  the  Commission  services for 1978  on  the  assumption  of 
unchanged policies are  taken  into consideration,  the"probable  growth rate 
of Community  GDP  in volume  for the  period of the  Fourth Programme  (176-80) 
is only 3.5  - 4.0  ~ p.a.  The  real risk of such a  development,  close  to 
that described by the  low-growth  case  of 1975  (outlook A)  can only emphasize 
the  need for  some  further thought about the  possibility of a  return to full 
employment.  These  aspects are treated in Chapter III of the  present document. ·- 5 - II/236;3 /77-E 
PROBL1EMS  PRESENTED  BY  THE  PROJECTIONS 
1. Population,  employment  and  growth 
The  total population of the  Community  will  grow  less  ~Aickly in the  period 
1976-80 than in the  last  15  years  (cf. table  3).  ~1is is due  to natural 
population movements  as well  as to migration.  But,  because  of the  age 
structure,  the  potential  supply of labour will  grow  considerably more 
rapidly  :  the  large nurnoors  of children born betM3en  the  last part  of 
the  1950's and 1965  will reach working age,  whilst the  t~akly represented 
age  groups  born during the  first world war will reach retirement  ~· 
The  percentage  of the  to·tal  population of working agB  ( 15  to 64 years) 
in the  Community  will thus  go  from  63.3% in 1975  to 64.4% in 1980. 
Starting from  a  total population of about  261  millions in 1980,  this 
structural increase  in the  share  of the  population of working age  of 1.1 
percentage  points represents around 2.9 million persons. Nevertheless, 
according to  the  figures  of the  projection  (outlook D  of Spring 1977), 
the  activity rate  of the total population will rise only by 0.3 points from 
41.6%  to 41.9%,  which  represents  about 0.8 million persone.2) 
This  small  increase in the overall activity rate 
is partly due  to the  continuation of the  declining trend in the  activity 
rates fdr  specific age  groups which  does  not completely offset the 
increase  in female  activity.  A significant part of this seems 
to be attributable to an implicit assumption 
in the  projections of an artifical reduction in the  active  population 
(early retirement,  longer education at school  or university,  discouragement 
of female  participation,  and  also  the  departure  of foreign workers). 
Al·though it is possible at the  Community  level neither to make  a.  precise 
1)  Tne  figures  for 1980,  unless  otherwise  indicated,  are  derived from  the 
outlook D (Spring 1977). 
2)  In absolute  terms,  that is to say taking account  of the  growth  of total 
population between  1975  and 1980,  the  population of working  a~ should 
increase  in the  projection period by about  5.1 millions,  whilst the 
working population should  only increase  by  about  2.2 millions. - 6- II/236/3/77-E 
estimate  of the  weight  of these different effects,  nor to what  extent it is a 
result of deliberate  policy or simply of the  discouragement  of workers  in 
presenting themselves for work,  it is clear that,  according to the  projection 
an unusually high fraction of  the  potential increase  in the  labour  supply 
will not present itself on  the  labour markets  of the  Community. 
Taking account  of the  growth rate  (4.3 %  p.a.)  and  of productivity per head 
of the  working population  (3.8% p.a.) used in the  projections for 1976-80 
made  in Spring 1977,  the  unemployment  rate in the  Community  remains high 
in 1980:3.7% of the  active  population or roughly 4 million people. 
The  distribution of this unemployment  between the  member  countries is 
uneven;  the  projections for certain countries assume  a  return to more 
tolerable  levels  (D,  L,  DK);  for  others the  1980  rate  gives rise to 
anxieties  (UK,  IRL),  (see  table  4). 
A particular uncertainty in this context  resides in the  adjustment  of 
productivity per head  of  the  working population to the  different growth 
rates in the  medium  term.  vfuat  appears to be  of prime  importance  is the  long run 
stability of the  gro~vth rate  of productivity*. Experience  of the  period 
from  the early nineteen-fifties in most  member  States  only allows  the 
documentation  of conjunctural reactions and not  trend adjustments.  Never-
theless,  the  analyses made  in this area suggest  the  following conclusions 
The  medium·  and long-term development  of productivity is closely linked with 
the  investment  share  in GDP.  It is through investment  that  technical progress 
is introduced in the  production process.  During recent years the  investment 
share  has diminished and the  growth of net  investment  has been  lov1  or even 
negative  in  some  cases. nevertheless the  scale  of investment,  especially of 
replacement  investment,  which  continues to be  under~ken assures and v-Till  assure 
always  a  modernization  of the  productive  apparatus.  To  a  certain extent, 
technical  progresG and organizational  progress have  also been  stimulated 
by  the  high relative  cost  of labour related to  the  grotvth in the  wage  share  in 
GDP;  therefore  rationalization investment has  been favoured  and  investment 
of the  capital widening type,  which creates new  jobs has  been  discourage·d. 
The  thesis of a  relative inertia in the  growth of productivity per head of 
the  working population is also  supported by  the  fact  that  the  mechanical 
effect of the  reduction in working hours  on  productivity per head is in 
~neral partially compensated  byadditional rationalization.  Naturally certain 
*  Cf.  Annex,  graph l7b. 
** Even  in the  recession year 1975  the  share  of fixed  investment  in GDP 
in volume  remained at  21.6 %. - 7- II/236/3  /77-E 
structural effects due  to the  transfer of labour  betv;een sectors  (e.g.  from 
agriculture  to  industry)  and.  to  ·the  change  in the  sectoral  cornposi ticn of 
prod.uction are  also  important;  for example 7  an  increase  in the  services 
sector,  tends generally,  though not  in all cases,  to  someHhat  reduce  tile 
growth of global productivity per head of the  working pcpulation,  vlhilst 
the  development  of ne\·1  production areas with a  low labour intensity such 
as in the  past natural gas  in the  Netherlands,  or from  nov;  on oil in the 
United Kingdom  increases productivity per head. 
The  very clear slowing of productivity grow-th  per head of the  working population 
in the  recession years  1974  and  1975  (cf.  table  5)  is essentially due  to 
the  under-utilization of resources of capital and labour  vlithin private  in-
dustry. On  the  o·ther hand,  the  example  of the  clearly faster acceleration 
of productivity than of production in 1976  (for the  Co~nunity GDP  in volume 
+4.6  ;~,  global productivity +5.1  y~)  shows  clearly the mobilization of 
productivity reserves  in the  cyclical upswing. 
lilor  the  medium-term development  from  1976  ·to  1980 the  Study  Group  is of the 
opinion that productivity per  occupied person in the  Go1mnuni ty could reach 
4'/o  again as a  mean  annual  rate  of growth  ( agli.nst  4. 3  ';&  per year in the  period 
1973/60) if the  medium-term  gro-vrth  rate  of  GDP  sufficiently exceeds this 
underlying g1  ... owth of productivity  and if investment  gTows  adequately  (cf. 
paragraph  4 belov.r  of this  chapter~.  T'nis  hypbthe sis of productivity appears 
prudent  and does not  include  any medium-term  catching up  of the  losses due 
to the  recession,  such as was  observed after previous recessions. 
In the  case  of a  slower  growth of GDP  in the  medium  term,  the  development 
of measured productivity could be  lovJer and  similar to thc:t  of GDP,  because 
of the  continuation of the effects of the under-utilization of resources; 
such  a  development  would have  an unfortunate effect  on behaviour,  on the 
growth  of  investment  and  job creation; it would thus reinforce  the  lack of 
available  emplcyment  at  a  time  v1hen  the  active  population is growing a.nd 
would lead to  an  under-employment  equilibrium which  would.  mark the  end of 
the  economic  dynamism  which has  charcrlerized almost all the  E.'uropean 
economies  siQce  the  end of the  war. 
r.rhis  reasoning has the  following important  implications 
The  growth  of productivity per head of  the  working peopulation in the 
Conununity  in the  projections  (3.8% p.a.)  lies at the  lo-vrer  limit of the 
plausible margin around the  hypothesis  of approximately 4 1o  per annum. 
As  an illustration of this,  if,  other things being equal,  the  projections 
underestimated the  growth  of productivity by  only 0.1 points per annum, - 8- II/236/3/77-E 
the  number  of unemployed  in the  Community  would  be  about  half a  million higher 
in 1980.  The  unemployment  rate  in 1980  resulting from  the  projections would 
appear  optimistic therefore.  This is equally true if one  considers that the 
growth  of the  global  activity rate  in the  projections appears  lov1  or perhaps 
underestimated with  respect  to the  development  of the  population of working 
age  mentioned at the  beginning of this chapter. 
A purely mechanical  calculation,  assuming  either a  constant activity rate  of the 
population between  15  and  64 years of age  at  the  1975  level  or  productivity 
growth at the  trend level  (1973/60)  of 4·3  %per annum,  permits  the  quantifi-
cation of the  extreme  value  of these  two  effects which  corresponds  to an  increase, 
compared  with the  projections,  in the  unemployment  rate  of respectively 1,0 and 
2.0 points  (of.  table  6,  lines 2  and  3).  Even  if neither of these  two  hypotheses is 
realistic,  this calculation illustrates the  importance  of the  hypotheses 
concerning the activity rate  and productivity for the  rate  of unemployment 
in 1980. 
- If the  plausible  hypothesis  on  the  underlying development  of medium-tenn 
productivity growth  (approx.  4%  p.a.) is realized,  it would  be  necessa~ 
taking account  of the  growth  of the  active  population  (see  table  3)  - to 
achieve  a  rate  of growth of Community  GDP  in volume  surpassing  4-~  /o  p.a. 
in the  period 1976-80  in order to stabilize the  unemployment  level and 
to start reducing it in a  healthy and non-artificial manner. 
The  Study Group  thus  confinns  the  option that the  medium-term  solution to the 
employment  problem  is primarily · through sustained growth. 
If the  grov1th  rate  could be  higher,  considerable  reserves  of manpower  and 
probably of productivity could be  mobilized in the  Community.  This  is 
precisely the  objective  of the  Fourth Programme,  which  aims at  solving the 
problem of unemployn1ent  mainly through  growth and which  seeks to avoid,  as 
far as possible,  the  slowing of productivity and  the  artificial reduction 
of the  labour  supply beyond  what  is desirable  from  the  social  point  of view 
in order to lower unemployment.  An  example  of the  achievement  of the Fourth 
Programme  objectives of a  GDP  growth rate  in excess  of the  4~- - 5  ;{,  minimum 
is given in line  5 of table  6;  in fact,  with a  growth rate  of 5.1  ~ p.a., 
under certain conditions,  the  unemployment  rate  could  be  cut back to 
2.3 %  of the  active  population between now  and 1980. - 9- II/236/3/77-E 
2.  Developments  in prices and  costs 
The  average  rise  in private  consumption  prices for  the  period 1976-80 
remains high in the  outlook D of Spring 1977  in all countries except 
Germany,  and  to a  lesser extent Denmark  (cf.  table 7).  The  mean  inflation 
*  rate  in the  Community  for  the  period 1976-80,  at 8.5  ~ p.a., is only 
slightly lower than that for  the  previous five year period  (1971-75  : 
9.6% p.a.). Nevertheless for all the  countries this outlook  implies a 
slowing of inflation during the  period;  the  high average  for the  period 
1976-80  masks  therefore  a  downward  movement  whilst  the  mean  of the 
previous period resulted from  an upward  one. 
In all the  projections,  this slowing-down of inflation is related to 
a  "normalization"  of  the  relationship between wages  and profits;  in fact 
the  corrected wage  share  (=  share  of wages  in GDP  in value  terms  corrected 
for the  change  in the  proportion of wage  and  salary earners in total 
employment)  would fall by 1980,  according to the  projections,  to a 
level  which  in general is close  to or below that  of 1972/74  (cf.  table  9 
and diagram 14).  At  the  same  time  these  two  asepcts,  slowing of 
inflation and  change  in the  wage  share,  represent  in the  projections,  as 
indeed in the  Fourth Programme,  an  important  condition for an increase  in 
investment activity and a  vigorous  and lasting medium-term  growth. 
However,  the process  of decelerating inflation implied in all the 
projections,  has  started very differently in the  member  countries. 
In Germany  the  fall expected in the  rate  of inflation in the  projections 
was  achieved by  1977.  In France  and the  Benelux countries a  slowing-down of 
inflation can  be  detected but it occurred relatively late and still remains 
weak  and delicate.  In Denmark  the  rise  in consumer prices is affected by 
the  increase  in VA'r  rates; if allowance  is made  for this factor,  a  deceleration 
in the  rise  of prices is discernible for this country too.  In view of the 
very high inflation rates  (over 20%  per year in 1975),  the  reduction of 
inflation in the United Kingdom  and Ireland to rates of the  order of 15  /o  in 
1977  is noticeable but still not enough;  the  search for stability is closely 
*  Calculated on  the  basis of 1970  prices and exchange  rates. - 10- II/236/3/TT-E 
tied to the  success  of  incomes  policy,  which is proving increasingly 
difficult to achieve.  In Italy, after a  remarka:ble  slowing-down during 
1975,  with the  annual  rate falling from  over  20  ~ in 1974 to around 
10  fo  in December  1975  (over December  197 4),  inflation again accelerated 
rapidly in 1976  to reach,  once  ~ore _,  annual  rates in excess of 20 %  in 
late  1976/early 1977. 
Compared  with the  movement  of  GDP  pricest  the  rise  in wagB  costs per unit 
of output,  according to the  Economic  Budgets,  is less in 1976  and  1977  in  almost 
all member  countries  (see  table  7).  This means  that the  return to normal 
in the  wage-profits  share  foreseen  in all the  forecasts is indeed coming about. 
Nevertheless if in the  majority of cases  some  often remarkable  progress 
has  been made  in the  direction indicated in the  projections,  some  member 
countries still have  a  considerable  way  to  go  (notably,  I, NL,  UK*- see  table  9). 
Despite  this favourable  element,  the  slowing-down  of inflation remained in  al~0st 
all member  countries insufficient to  contribute decisively to  the  creation 
of favourable  conditions for a  lasting recover,y in growth,  particularly 
through  investment  as foreseen in the  Fourth Medium-term  Economic  Policy 
Programme. 
The  scant  success  of the  action taken in most  member  countries 
in achieving a  worthwhile  reduction in inflation rates with effect from 
the  beginning of the  forecast  period is proving increasingly to  be  an  obstacle 
to any durable  resumption of growth.  Rigidity in the  development  of wages 
and the  lack of social  consensus  have  led economic  policy-makers in  some 
member  countries to be  cautious in their use  of macroeconomic  weapons  to 
combat  inflation  (particularly as regards monetar,y  and credit policy) 
for fear of the effects on  unemployment.  On  the  other hand,  the  fear of 
rekindling inflation after the first successes  of stabilization programmes 
inhibits economic  policy-makers adopting policies overtly geared to growth. 
*  Taking account  of the  correction made  "ad hoc"  to the  current  surplus 
of the  United Kingdom  (cf.  page  17  of this report)  the  adjustment  requirement 
as  concerns  income  distribution is lessened but still exists. - 11- II/236;) /77-E 
Another ver,y  important factor in this context is the  chan~ in 
exchange  rates.  This is closely linked to the  wide  divergences 
between  countries in the  development  of costs and prices  (in national 
currencies)  and  appears at the  same  time  as both cause  and effect of 
the  course  of inflation in the  member  countries. 
During the  forecast  period,  the  divergences between  countries  in the 
development  of  costs and prices remain  a  cause  for anxiety  (see  table 8). 
If the  Community  mean,  measured by  the  growth  of the  GDP  deflator  (8.6  ~ p.a.) 
is relatively close  to the  international hypothesis  assumed at  the  start 
(cf.  table  1),  the  divergences from  this mean  increase  for the  projection 
period to  around  20% below  (Germany)  and  27  %above  (Italy).  This  corresponds 
to bilateral differences of 58  fo  between Italy and  Germany  and more  than  40 % 
between the  United Kingdom  and Ireland on  the  one  hand and Germany  on  the 
other.  The  trends in France  and  the  Benelux countries are  much  closer to 
the  Community  average. 
The  cumulated deviations from  the  Community  mean  ·are  also  significant 
in the  case  of wages  and  salaries per unit  of production as well.  The 
deviation is negative  in the  case  of Germany,  Netherlands and Denmark 
(- 17%  to - 10~) and positive  in the  case  of Italy ( +  29  %) • For It'rance, 
Belgium,  Luxembourg  and also for the  United Kingdom  a.nd  Ireland the 
cumulative  deviation from  the  mean  does not exceed  -1-~~ to +4;i%.  This result 
for  the  United Kingdom  and Ireland,  surprising to  some  extent  considering 
their deviations in terms  of the  GDP  price,  is due  to optimistic assumptions 
on  the  growth of productivity and especially the  very moderate  assumptions 
on  the  development  of  wages  and  salaries.  In fact,  the  projections for these 
two  countries assume  a  ver,y  marked  reduction in the  corrected wage  share* 
(of  the  order of 10 points or 14  ~on the  starting value  in 5 years). 
The  size  of envisaged deviations in prices and costs clearly demonstrate  the 
lack of convergence  in the  economic  trends and economic  policies 
within the  Community.  The  difficulties involved in reaching a  common  monetar~ system 
remain therefore  very great. 
Changes  in the  exchange  rate  cannot  therefore  be  excluded as  a  possibility 
during the  remainder of the  projection period.  But  it would  be  premature 
to  conclude  in the  present  situation,  that  the  disparities described above 
will  lead necessarily,  between now  and 1980,  to compensating modifications 
in the  exchange  rate  of  the  same  order of magnitude.  The  massive  revaluations 
*  With  respect·  to the  United Kingdom,  of. note  a.t  foot  of page  10. - 12  - II/236/3/77-E 
and devaluations of recent years,  notably in 1973  and 1976,  have  created 
differences  in relative  costs  (given the  changes  in exchange  rates)  which 
for  some  time  yet  could permit - or even give.· rise  to - develop-
ments  in costs and in the  general  level in prices in the  member  states 
conce.rned  (in national  currency)  in the  opposite  direction (cf.  the  diag:cams 
24a  to 24i).  Given  the  existence  of these  margins,  the  magnitude  of the 
changes  in exchange  rates which may  occur between  no~'~ and  1980  depend more 
on  the  economic  policy followed from  now  on than on  the  differences in 
cost  (in national  currency)  described by the  projections,  which  can still 
be  influenced by economic policy and  by  the  behaviour of the  social partners. 
The  interaction between the  variation in relative prices and  the  exchange 
rate  has  been  analyzed up  to now  mainly from  a  short-term perspective  and 
from  the  point  of view of export prices or the  prices of tradable  industrial  goods, 
which adapt  rapidly when  exchange  rates change.  The  adjustment  of relative 
costs  and exchange  rates in the  medium  and  long term,  as well  as  the 
structural effects which are  related to them  must  be  studied more  deeply 
in the  future.  The  Stu~ Group  intends to develop this analysis in the 
coming months  and afterwards to present its general  conclusions. 
But  even at the  present  stage  of work,  it would  seem  useful  to underline 
the  following aspects:* 
During the  long period characterized by fixed rates of exchange  (1950-70), 
inflation remained  slow in the  Community  (1970/56  :  3.9  /o  p.a.).  The 
divergences in the  evolution of  costs and prices which appeared were 
absorbed- sometimes  with difficulty  (Italy)  - ~s changes  in nominal 
incomes;  if it was  not  possible  (as in France  1958/59)  or not  opportune 
(Germany  1961,  France  and  Germany  1969)  to adjust nominal  incomes,  recourse 
was  had  to exchange  rate  changes  which  offset  (or .svmetime s  more  than 
.offset)  the  divergences  in costs and prices by  several  percent. 
In certain cases divergences  in the  evolution of costs and prices  seem 
to have  been necessary for  structural  reasons  (for example,  rapid 
industrialization, exploitation of natural gas in the  Netherlands). 
* Cf.  on this point the tables  22  and  23  as  well  as  the series of graphs  24a) 
to 24i)  concerning the variations  in relative costs taking account  of 
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Since  recourse  to  changing pari  ties v.;as  exceptional  in this  system, 
a  certain stabilizing pressure  was  forced  on  those  countries where 
the  rate  of growth  of costs tended to exceed the  average  rate  in 
partner countries  (abstracting from  certain structural effects),  whilst 
the  countries in which  costs rose  less than in partner states would 
be  subjected to  imported inflation and  an export orientation in their 
productive  apparatus.  These  of course  are  medium-term adjustments. 
With the  change  to flexible  exchange  rates from  1971  on,  the  inflation 
rate  vias  increased in all the  industrialized countries  (EUH-9:  1976/70 
~~- l~fo p.a.) for different reasons.  The  freeing of the  exchange  rate 
gave  increased autonomy  - at least apparent - of economic  policy,  notably 
as far as  the  regulation of internal liquidity '~s concerned,  which had 
been used in a  very different  way  by  certain member  states.  Thus  pronounced 
disparities in economic  policy,  considerable  changes  in the  exchange  rate 
and  considerable divergence  in the  gro\vth rate  of prices and of costs -
which no  one  could have.  believed possible  at the  time  of the  development 
of the  project for economic  and monetary union- became  possible. It 
should be  noted that  in this period,  contrary to what  occurred in the 
period of fixed exchange  rates,  the  massive  variations in the  exchange 
rates clearly preceded the  growth  of dirferences in costs and the 
general  price  level  (cf.  diagrruns24a  to 24i).  The  adjustment  process 
thus started is likewise  a  medium-term  process. 
Without  the  successive  revaluation of the  Jl•1  the  spectacular price stabili-
zation  in Germany  v10uld  not  have  been possible.  But  the  combination 
of large  revaluations 1  the  continuation of the  growth  of the  corrected 
wage  share  up  to 197 4/5 and  the  restrictive policies to fight  against 
internal inflation is certainly connected to the  weakness  of  investment 
in the  period 1971-75 and the  insufficient creation of  jobs.  At  the  present 
time  it can be  asked to what  extent the  moderation being exercised in 
wage  and~ary growth will result in the  creation of additional  jobs 
or will  simply lead without  complementary expansionary measures,  to a  new 
revaluation of the  ll4  (exrunple  of 1976). 
In those  countries which have  had  large  devaluations,  in the  op1.n1.on  of 
most  of the  experts,  the  continuation of the  expansion of internal liquidity 
at a  high rate  and the effect of maintaining in this situation salary 
indexation  systems has allovred costs.and internal prices to follow the 
devaluations with a  certain lag.  The  resulting high inflation rates 
have  ~ggravated social  tensions and distributional conflicts in these  countries. 
This inflation has also discouraged investment,  especially in export  industries 
because  of the  permanent  risk that  growth in costs would  absorb  the 
profit margin  gained  through the  devaluation,  thus eliminating the 
profitability oi'  such investment.  At  each devaluation,  the  question arose 
as to whether it would  vlOrk  in the  direction of redressing the  current ba-
lance  or if it would not rather lead to a  new  dose  of inflation.  'l'he 
development  from  devaluation to new  devaluation and consecutive  rises 
in prices and internal  costs has  only been  slowed with difficulty by 
incomes  policy. All  in all, massive  devaluations have  certainly permitted - 14- II/236/3/77-E 
some  improvement  of relative costs but without  adequate  accompanying 
policies have  rendered high rates of inflation possible  and have  delayed 
the  necessary major  struc·tural  and behavi9ural  adjustments;  devaluatiort 
without  success  in stabilization policy is self-defeating. 
These  considerations  obviously do  not  signify that it is possible,  from 
now  on,  to return to a  system of fixed rates of exchange  within the 
Community,  but  further consideration of the  size  of exchange  rate 
changes desirable  in the  Community,  especially in view of the  medium-
term adjustments and the effects on  inflation,  seems  to  be  advisable. 
But  if the  persistence  of high inflation rates today . 
is an  obstacle  to growth  and the  return to full employment,  the  necessary 
stabilization of costs and prices in the  countries especially concerned 
implies also  a  stabilization of the  exchange  rate,  which however  should 
be  facilitated today if one  considers the  differences in existing 
relative  costs following the  exchange  rate movements  of recent years 
(of.  table  22  and diagrams  24&  to 241). 
The  achievement _of  a  higher level  of convergence  of economic  policy and 
better monetary organization of the  Community  is linked to the  achieve-
ment  of much  lower inflation rates within the  Community.  If not,  the 
stabilization of existing exchange  rates could lead,  for those  countries 
having best mastered internal inflation,  to further  imported inflation. 
But  also this problem  seems  to  be  temporarily reduced given the  cost 
differences created by  the  revaluations of recent years.  A moderate 
development  of costs,  in the  absence,  over_ a  certain period,  of new  massive 
·revaluations,  would  create  in the  countries most  concerned at present, 
favourable  conditions for a  high rate  of growth  compa·ti ble  with price 
stability and a  more  rapid return to full  emplo~nent;  such  growth and 
the better control  of inflation in the  partner countries would also 
contribute  to the  realization of a  more  satisfactor,y situation on  the 
balance  of payments. - 15  - II/236/3/77-E 
. 
3·  The  achievement  of external equilibrium 
When  the  Fourth  Progrffilli~e  was  being drawn  up,  it seemed  plausible to 
suppose .that the  OPEC  countries might  again  show  in 1980  a  current  account 
in balance  with the  industrialized countries  (see  point  55  of the  Fourth 
Programme).  In these  circumstances,  the  Community  would  have  been able 
to achieve  a  certain surplus in goods,  services and factor  incomes  (0.5 
to 1 %  of GDP)  which would have  been available  to finance  development 
aid and transfers by  foreign workers;  thus the  current balance  of the 
Community  would  have  been approximately in balance  or slightly in deficit 
in 1980  (see  point  75  of the  Fourth Programme). 
According to the  latest estimates,  the  OPEC  countries are  more  likely 
to maintain in 1980  a  current surplus of the  order of $  30  Mrd. 
According to outlook D (of.  table  lOa),  the  Community  as a  whole  would 
in 1980  show  a  current  account  surplus  (or roughly a  total net  lending 
capacity) representing about  1 %  of the  value  of its GDP,  or  something 
of the  order of $  22  Mrd.  (at Februar.y 1977  exchange  rates);  some  two-
thirds of this surplus  ($  14 Mrd.)  would  come  from  the  United Kingdom 
surplus. If it is assume~ that the  current  surplus of the United Kingdom 
is only 2%  of current price  GDP  (see  paragraph below on  the  United Kingdom), 
the  surplus  of the  Community  would  be  'of the  order of$ 14-15  Mrd.,  or 
0.65 %  of  GDP. 
It may  be  wondered whether  such an amount  can be  incorporated into the 
s.ystem  of overall balnnces at world level.  If the  $  22  I(rd  (or  $  14 Mrd) 
current account  surplus now  projected for the  Community  is added to the  OPEC 
countries'  $  30  Mrd  current  surplus,  equilibrium can only be  achieved if 
considerable deficits persist elsewhere  in the  world. 
There  is therefore  a  danger  of the  current account projections available 
at present being incompatible  at world level.  The  probability of this being 
so  is all the  greater since  some  national projections are either still 
·based on  the  Fourth Programme's assumption of current  account equilibrium 
between the  OPEC  countries and the  industrialized countries,  or are  markedly 
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Consequently,  the  uncertainty regarding the  current balances projected at 
present for the  member  countries is particularly marked,  although at Community 
level,  examination of the  figures does not,  in  meneral, .show  any  obvious 
incompatibilities ru1d  although import elasticities appear,  on  the  whole, 
plausible  in view of the  changes in exchange  rates which have  occurred. 
The  projections,  set  out  in tables lOa - lOc  ,  must  not  therefore  be 
interpreted as a  firm forecast  of the  member  countries•  external situation 
in 1980;  they are  rather pointers,  often normative  in character,  which 
nonetheless describe  the nature  of the  problems. 
The  results by  countrY  suggest  the  following comments 
Germany  a.nd  the  Belgian-Luxembourg economic union t.;ill  return to their 
traditional type  of balz.mce  :  a  slight  surplus of current account  or 
slight total net  lending permitting a  certain net export  of capital. 
France,  Itall and Deruuark  will have  in 1980  a  current  account  roughly 
in balance  or slight total net borrowing.  For Italy tnis means  that 
the  accumulated external debt  over the years 1973  to  1977  vTill  only 
be  able  to  be  paid back to  any extent after 1980;  nevertheless assessment 
of the external  situation of this country must  take  account  also  of the 
outflows of private  capital which accumulated in a  considerable  manner 
between 1960  and 1972.  For  ~nmark the  return to an  approximate  balance 
on  current account  in 1980  is envisa~d by  the  projections. 
Ireland will still have  a  current  account  deficit in 1980,  but  this will 
be  more  thru1  offset by  the  inflow of capital from  abroad. 
The  Netherlands and the  United Kingdom  are  special  cases. 
The  high current  surplus of the Netherlands which is projected for 1980 
is mainly due  to natural  gas,  which is exported and also reduces energy 
imports,  and to the  trend of energy prices.  This  surplus,  clearly,  could 
be  absorbed by  an even faster development  of internal prices and costs 
or by  an even higher revaluation.  This  would mean  nonetheless a  significant 
loss of competitivity by the  traditional export  industries,  the  closure 
of firms and  the  creation of addi·t;ional  structural unemployment.  Morever, 
when  natural  gas  production and the  revenue  it earns begin to fall,  the 
country vrill  once  again have  to rely,  for the  achievement  of its external 
balance,  on  its traditional export  industries. It would therefore  seem 
preferable to achieve  a  considerable export  of capital in the  present 
situation. - 17- II/236;3 /77-E 
The  surplus  on  current  account  of the  United Kingdom  would  on  the  currently 
available  projection reach  4 %  of current price  GDP  in 1980.  rl'he  Study 
Group  considers nevertheless that  a  current account  surplus in 1980  of the 
order of 2 %  of GDP  in value  would appear more  plausible  in view of the 
domestic and international situation; this would ease  adjustment  problems, 
particularly as regards the  trend of incomes  and  the  allocation of resources. 
The  emergence  of a  large external  surplus can  be  explained by  a  favourable 
development  of exports follov1ing the  devaluations of  the  pound  and by  the 
very moderate  development  of real wages  which is assumed in the  projection, 
lutnotably also qy  the  exploitation of North-Sea oil. The  total net  lending 
thus freed will  be  required for the  rapid pay-off of the  very high external 
debt  which  the  United Kingdom  has accumulated in the  past.  In order that 
this healthier outlook might  be  achieved,  it is nevertheless necessary to 
halt the  race  between exchange  rate  and the  trend of prices and  incomes, 
to  overcome  the  social  tensions resulting therefrom and to make  a  real 
effort at industrial reorganization. 
Given  the  situation at world  level,  the  question remains whether the  Comnnmity 
as  a  \·rhole  can achieve  a  current account  surplus in 1980,  even if the  surplus 
were  to be  smaller than that produced by  simply totalling the  projections 
currently available. It IDalf  be  useful here  to recall a  number  of observations 
from  the  past and from  recent years. 
~~e developing countries as a  group traditionally had,  before  the  rise 
in oil prices,  a  deficit in goods  and services of the  order of 0.5 %to 
0.6 %  of the  GDP  of ·Ghe  OECD.  This deficit was  compensated for by  development 
aid,  granted partly in the  form  of transfers (their current account  thus 
being much  less in deficit)  and partly in the  form  of credits.  This situation 
already at the  time  aroused anxiety concerning the  limits to the  indebtedness 
of these  countries. 
Following the  rise  in oil prices,  an extremely unequal  distribution of 
the  deficits correspondi-_lg to the  OPEC  su,rplus  came  ubout  in the  world. 
As  table  11  shov-1s,  it was  chiefly the  USA,  Japan and the  Community  as 
a  whole  which were  able  largely or wholly  (USA)  to  compensate  their oil 
deficits during 1974  to 1976  by  surpluses with other regions of the  world. 
The  other OEGD  countries and especially the  developine countries  showed 
deficits equal  to or,  for the  developing countries,  more  than double  their 
oil deficits. It is worth noting also that the  state-trading countries, 
which,  on  the  whole,  did not  show  a  deficit with the  OPEC  countries, 
noticeably increased their trading deficit financed by  credit during the 
same  period from  1974 to 1976,  which  contributed to the  growth of exports, 
particularly of the  main  western industrialized countries. - 18  - II/236/3/77-E 
A similar phenomenon  of unequal  distribution of balance  of payment  situations 
has  been evident within the  Gomrmmity  (see  table  12).  Here,  the  effects 
of the  rise  in oil prices came  on  top of disequilibria which already existed 
in 1973,  due  mainly  to divergences  in economic  policy between  Germany  on 
the  one  hand.and Italy and the  United Kingdom  on  the  other.  In addition 
to  the  effects produced by divergences  in overall management  of economies 
and in the  trend of exchange  rates and inflation,  structural differences 
emerged in member  colintries'  ability to  respond,  through exports,  to the 
new  demand  created at world level. 
These  observations  show  that it has been possible for a  very unequal 
distribution of external deficits and  surpluses to exist in the  world. 
If stable financing structures are  found,  and accepted,  as was  the  case 
for the  developing countries before  the  rise  in oil prices,  such a  situation 
can continue  over a.long period.As far as the  distribution and financing 
of oil deficits is concerned,  the  situation appears to be  distinctly less 
stable:  for  obvious reasons,  the  deficit countries have  sought  and are 
still  ~seking to  improve  their external situation. 
At  Community  leve~  the  currently available projections ~ven without 
precise figures.- show  this clearly  :  in accordance  with the  short-term 
outlook  (see  the estimates for 1977  in table  10),  they assume  that balance 
of payments deficits will disappear or even be  reversed  (United Kingdom) 
within the  Community.  For the  countries which have  been in deficit up  to 
now,  this "change  of debitor" is desirable,  to avoid the  accumulation of 
excessive external debts.  The  Co~nunity surplus resulting from  such a  trend 
implies that the  Community • s  problems would be  overcome  primarily by an 
*  increase  in the  debts of the  other industrialized countries  ,  the East  bloc 
and the developing countries. 
If this distribution of deficits and the  corresponding indebtedness 
are not  accepted,  it seems  likely that there will be  defensive  reactions, 
* In the  light  of  the  foreseeable  trend of its oil imports,  the  United States 
could build up  a  considerable external deficit by  1980.  Attempts to reduce 
of eliminate this potential deficit could have  important  consequences, 
especially as regards exchange  rates,  growth  and inflation. ~·· . 
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overcompensatory devaluations,  followed  b.Y  inflationary adjustments,  slowing 
down  of growth,  etc.,  such as has  been  observed during the  past years within 
and  outside  the  Community.  Moreover,  recourse  to protectionist measures 
cannot  be  ruled out.  If such a  state of affairs came  about  at world level 
between now  and 1980  the  Community's  surplus might not  be  achieved or might 
*  only be  achieved by  sacrificing growth and the  return to full employment. 
This  trend is already becoming apparent at present.  The  situation and outlook 
for the  balance  of payments at the  world level are  therefore,  together with 
the  problem  of inflation,  a  major obstacle  to growth. 
4·  Resource  utilization,  prima£¥  incomes  and public finance 
The  analysis of the  Fourth Medium-Term  Economic  Policy Programme  is largely 
confirmed by the  present projections as far as resource utilization,  primar,y 
incomes  and public finance  are  concerned.  It suffices therefore  to recall 
here  the  main  aspects at the  Community  level. 
In the  structure  of GDP  by expenditure  category at  constant prices  (of. 
table  13a)the extent  of the  reestablishment  of the  share  of investment  between 
1975  and 1980  appears to  be  rather small  (from  20.2 %  in 1975  to  23  %  in 
1980);  two  thirds of this  growth will  be  due  to  restocking and not  to gross 
fixed capital formation.  The  share  of net  resources going to exports  (balance 
of goods  and services at 1970 prices) will  grow quite  fast  (from  2.5  ~in 
**  1975  to 4.0 %  in 1980).  The  Community's  return to a  position of surplus 
on  the balance  of  p~ments at current prices,  which has  just been examined 
in the  previous  chapter,  will therefore  be  obtained through a  reduction 
in the  availability of real resources within the  Community.  The  share  at 
• constant prices of private and public  consumption is reduced in consequence 
respectively by  2.9 and  1.5 points. It should be  underlined  that insofar as 
* 
** 
See  on  this subject the  last five  li~es of point  75  of the  Fourth Programme. 
In view of the  ttad  hoc"  correction applied to the  current  surplus of the 
United Kingdom  (of.  previous paragraph,  page  17),  this figure  could be 
a  few  decimal  points lower;  this would  slightly ease  adjustment  problems 
regarding allocation of resources and distribution of incomes. - 20  - II/236/3 /77-E 
it would  seem  difficult to further reduce  the  share  of resources 
devoted to consumption,  the  restoration of an external  surplus  on  the  one 
hand and  of investments  on  the  other are  in competition for real disposable 
resources.  For the  Cownunity  as  a  whole  it would  have  been preferable  on this 
point to have  aimed at  a  balanced external  p~ents situation in 1980  or 
to maintain  a  slight deficit at current prices  so as  to  increase 
investment rather more  and therefore  growth and employment  as well. 
Applying the  estimates for  1976  and 1977  to the  Community  (see  table  13a) 
shows  that the  relative  slowdown  in the  growth  of the  volume  of private 
consumption,  and the  increase  in the  share  of resources given over to exports 
are  now  in progress.  However,  the  apparent  growth at constant prices,  of the 
share  of total  investment,  is solely due  to stock-rebuilding,  and the  share 
of gross· fixed capital formation is probably still falling. 
Thus,  from  the  point  of view of the  structure  of uses  of GDP  at current 
prices  (see  table  l3b), it .must  be  asked by  what  category of final  demand 
growth  could be  led in the  years ahead.  In view of the  medium-term guidelines 
and the need to restructure  the  use  of resources,  the  contribution which 
consumption  could  provid~~~Admost countries probably be  small;  in  some 
cases nevertheless private  consumer demand  can make  some  contribution provided 
it is based not  on  an additional  increase  in nominal  wages  but  on  a  fall in 
the  rate  of private  saving.  The  balance  of payments  situation at world 
level  (see  previous paragraph)  makes  any general  recovery based on  exports 
unlikely.  This means  that stimulating the  growth  of private  and public 
investment  is the  only remaining option. 
The  share  of wages  and salaries in GDP  (at current prices)  corrected for 
the  changes  in the  ratio of employees to-total employment  (=the 
corrected wage  share)  for the  Community  as a  whole  in 1980 is about  at the 
same  level as before  the  crisis (cf. diagram 14  and table  9).  This  develop-
ment  is common  to all the  member  states.  The  fall in the  corrected wage  share - 21.- II/236/3  /77-E 
*  will be  particularly marked  in the United Kingdom  and Ireland  whe~e it 
will decline  up  to 1980  by  around 10  points or roughly  14%  - 15/~ of the 
1975  starting value.  A trend in this direction began in 19q6  and 1977, 
although it is still inadequate  in  some  member  countries  (of.  page  9 of 
this document ) • 
In the  projections,  this "normalization"  of the  corrected  v1age  share  is 
the  condition for obtaining the  slowdown  in the  volume  growth of private 
consumption,  itself essential to release  an important  share  of resources 
necessary for  investment  and  the  balance  of payments.  The  reconstitution 
of the  profit margins  of firms,  which would  be  achieved at the  same  time, 
should increase their propensity to invest. Here  it is useful to recall 
that the normalization of firms'  profits is only a  necessary but not  a 
sufficient condition for  the  hoped for increase  in investment.  Apart  from 
the  creation of a  climate  of confidence,  which is indispensable,  it is 
essential also to have  a  sufficiently high degree  of utilization of capacity, 
which can  only be  obtained through sustained growth. 
In view of the  present  situation,  other measures  should therefore  be 
envisaged in order to obtain investment-led growth;  such measures might 
include  the  promotion of public investment,  and/or special measures to 
**  stimulate private  investment. 
* 
** 
Correcting the  United Kingdom's  current  surplus  (of.  previous paragraph, 
page  17)  means  that its need for adjustment  will  be  less. 
Some  experts consider that the  trend of private  investment  can accelerate 
only if the  growth rate  of  GDP  and the  degree  of capacity  utilization 
are  distinctly higher;  they particularly urge  therefore  stimulation 
through public  investment.  Other experts,  while  not  denying the  importance 
of growth of public  investment,  fear unfavourable  effects from  financing 
public investment  by means  of public indebtedness;  the  possible  increase 
in interest rates might  discourage  private  investment;  they therefore 
argue  for a  recovery based mainly on private  investment  which  would  be 
made  possible  by an improvement  in firms'  profitability; this presupposes 
a  faster and more  marked normalization of the  respective  shares of wages 
and profits and,  where  appropriate,  fiscal measures to stimulate private 
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As  far as  the  ~neral devel2pment  of public finance  is concerned,  the up-dating 
of the  projections hardly adds any new  information.  Diagram  15a shows,  at 
the  Community  le~ how,  apart  from  structural deficits  alrea~ existing in 
certain member  states,  the  recession has created a  significant  conjunctural 
deficit starting from  1974/75,  less through a  slowing-down of receipts than 
through a  marked  increase  in the  share  of expenditure  in GDP  in value 
terms  (because  of the  delays  in tax returns and thus in the  trend of revenue, 
faster growth of expenditure,  especially transfer expenditure,  unemployment 
benefits etc, but also tax reform  in Germany).  According to the  short-term 
estimates and the  information contained in the  projections, this deficit 
should be  markedly  reduced between now  and  1980,  mainly through a  stagnation 
or reduction in the  share  of expenditure  with a  more  normal  conjunctural 
situation. 
In 1975  the  public deficit at the  Community  level of 5fo  of  GDP  absorbed at 
the  macroeconomic  level  considerable  internal  savings,  which,  because  of the 
recession,  were  not  used for  investment.  A net  inflow of foreign  savings 
did not  take  place  in 1975,  given that  the  recession led to the  temporar,y 
disappearance  in that year of the  external deficit that  the  Community  as a 
whole  should have  normally recorded after the  rise in oil prices. 
In 1980  the  situation will  be  different  :  a  higher rate  of investment  (almost 
24 'fo  of  GDP  in value  for total investme·nt)  will  be  competing for internal 
pri  va.te  finance  with a  current external  surplus projected to  be  l  /o  (or 0.  7  J, 
after adjustment  of the  United Kingdom  figure)  of  GDP  and  with the  public 
deficit remaining.  The  sources  of  internal private financing of the  Community 
that is to  say the  financing capacity of households  and the  self-financing 
of businesses - represented roughly  24.5  to 25.5  ~ of  GDP  over  the  last 10 
years  (cf.  table 16). If this percentage  does not  increase  between now  and 
1980,  which appears plausible,  the  public deficit  should fall appreciably 
by  1980  (cf. table  16:  1980 a).  In so far as this is impossible,  mainly for 
specific structural  reasons  in certain countries,  it would  be  preferable 
and conform better with the  guidelines  of the  Fourth  Prograu~e, not to 
realize  the  projected external  surplus  (cf. table  16  :  1980  c)  in order not 
to have  to sacrifice  investment  (cf.  table  16  :  1980 b)  and thus growth and 
employment  as was  the  case  in 1975. 
In the  light of short-term developments,  and in particular the  lack of strong 
growth in gross fixed capital formation  and  the  fall,  in some  countries,  in 
the  volume  of public  investment  in 1976 and 1977,  it must  be  asked whether 
the  reduction of public deficits  (of.  table  15b)  has not  been too rapid. - 23  II/236/3/77-E 
A more  rapid increase  in public investment,  in addition to sustaining grovrlh, 
would  have  the  advantage  of being reversible- apart from  subsequent  operating 
expenditure- and of being less in contradiction with the  necessar.y  improve-
ment  of public finance. - 24- II/236/3/77-E 
CHAPTER  III  THREATS  TO  THE  ACHIEVEJYiJ};NT  OF  THE  GUIDELTiifES  LAID  DOHN  IN  TKB 
FOURTH  PROGRAMME,  AND  POSSIBLE  SCOPE  FOR  A RETURN  TO  FULL  EMPLOYMENT 
1. The  problem  of the  short-term path of gross domestic  product  and  investment 
In drawing up the Fourth Programme,  a  ce.rtain growth  path was  implicitly 
assumed  for the  period 1976-80.  This underlying hypothesis was  based in 
particular on  the  consideration that there  could be  no  real  recovery in 
investment until the  degree  of capacity utilization was  considerably higher 
than in the  base year 1975.  In these  circumstances,  rapid economic  recovery 
appeared all the  more  desirable  since if capacity underutilization continued 
for too long,  production capacity might  become  obsolete.  However,  it was 
also stressed that the  scale  of spare  and reusable  capacity also depended 
on  the  development  of demand  structure.  Because  of  the  changes  which had 
taken place  as a  result of the  recession and alterations in relative 
prices, it appeared probable  that the  "new''  demand  structure did not entirely 
correspond to the  old production structure.  Bottlenecks could therefore 
appear in  some  sectors before  eapacity was  fully reutilized in others. 
In this case,  new  investment  would  have  to be  carried out  so as to adapt 
the  structure of production to the  new  configuration of demand.  For this 
reason it was  necessar,y,  as from  a  certain phase  in the  recovery,  to avoid 
too rapid an acceleration and go  instead for a  more  regular growth profile. 
The  idea was  therefore to have  a  relatively rapid recovery,  so as to 
induce  investment to pick up  again as  soon as possible,  while  at the 
same  time  avoiding sectoral  overheating and,  consequently,  overheating 
of the  economy  as a  whole  during the  second or third year of the  recovery. 
In the first half of the  projection period,  the  growth rate  of  GDP  in 
volume  terms would therefore  have  had to be  higher than trend growth, - 25- II/236/3/77-E 
subsequently reverting to its underlying trend rate.  This  "ideal"  growth 
path for the  Community  had been illustrated as follows 
Community  GDP  in volume  terms 
- annual rates of change  in %  -
1976  1971  3·4  4:~  f4·6g  1972  3.9  1977  5ii·  - 6  3.0 
1973  5·5  1978  5  5t  3-ft 
1974  1.7  1979  4  4-;i 
1975  -2.0  1980  4  - 4~ 
¢  £ill.  2.5  ¢  1980  4:J..  5  1970  1975 
1[-
T. 
~ii th regard to this average  growth path for the  Community,  it was  considered 
necessar.y that member  countries'  economies  should be  temporarily out  of 
phase  to  some  extent,  so as to facilitate the  reduction of divergences in 
balances of payments  and price trends. 
Recovery within the  Cormmmi ty was  to be  led by  Germany,  whose  situation 
regarding prices and balance  of payments was  most  favourable,  with the 
Benelux countries,  then France  and Denmark  following suit,  while  Italy, 
the  United Kingdom  and Ireland were  to endeavour to control their cost 
and price trends,  so as to maintain the  margin resulting from  devaluation 
(at the  same  time  stabilizing their exchange  rates)  and thus to rely on 
exports as  one  of the elements  generating growth. 
The  need for economic  cycles to be  temporarily out  of phase  appeared all the 
greater since,  contrary to "classical rules",  economic  policy had been 
rather expansionary in the  countries whose  currency had fallen  substantially 
in value  a.nd  rather restrictive in the  countries v1hose  currency had been 
considerable  revalued.  It can be  argued that this divergence  in economic 
policies lay behind the  phenomena  of overcompensation in exchange  rate 
variations and subsequent  divergences in cost and price trends.  rr.his  prevented 
exchange  rate  variations from  having their full effect  on  the  balance  of payments 
(of.  also Chapter II, paragraphs  2  and 3). 
*  Commission estimates and  short-term forecasts available M~  1977. - 26- II/236/3./77-E 
Developments  in 1976  were  already \rell  committed in this direction,  notably in 
Germany.  For  other countries the  recommended  timing of growth  -v.ras  not  al-vmys 
respected,  and above  all most  countries v1ere  not  sufficiently successful  in the 
fight against  inflation (cf.  pp.  9-10 above).  Tne  latest available  short-term 
forecasts  (M~ 1977)  show  that  the  kind  of  timepath described above  is not 
being follovred either for  the  Community  as a  whole  or for the  majority of 
the  member  countries. 
The  considerations  on  the  conjunctural  timepath  remain valid nevertheless, 
but  time  has been lost in achieving the  guidelines laid dovm  in the  Fourth 
Programme,  and  the  danger  of a  stop-go pa·ttern  (already pointed to  in the 
Programme)  has considerably increased.  The  time  available  to redress the 
situation seems  to  be  limited  :  indeed there  is a  danger that Germany,  in 
view of its internal situation,  will  be  able  to provide  a  lead as regards 
growth inside  the  Community  only up  to  the  middle  or end of 1978. If this 
judgement  is correct,  stabilization should be  established in the  other 
"major countries" by then,  so that these  countries can then take  over in 
maintaining grovrlh. 
Graph  17a traces the  conjunctural  timepath  of the  growth rates of Cownunity 
GDP  in volume  terms  (trends for each  com1try  are  given in table  20),  the 
rates for  1976  (4.6  /~)  and  1977  (3.0;~)  being included in the  Conunission 
economic  budgets  (May  1977);  the  residual rate  for 1978,  19'79  and  1980 
(4.6  7~ p.a.) necessary to achieve  outlook D  (1980/75  :  4. 3 p.a.)  seems 
optimistic,  but not yet entirely out  of reach if the necessary economic 
policies are followed rapidly.  However;  if one  takes account,  despite all 
the uncertainties involved,  of the  Commission's intial estimate  for 1978 
(3~ ~), made  on  the  hypothesis of the  economic  policy known  at the  present 
time,  a  growth rate  of the  order of  3.5·~ to  4.0~ p.a.  for  1976-80 would  be 
more  plausible than the  present projection. 
The  Stu~ Group  considers that  such a  development  is a  very real danger. 
The  consequences appear similar to those  of the  low-gror.-rth  variant  of end-1975 
(outlook A,  pp.  1-2 above)  :  the  Community  is therefore  in danger  of 
settling into under-employment equilibrium,  and  the  possi'bility of growth 
and a  return to full employment,  even in the  period 1980-85,  is in danger 
of being seriously compromised. - 27- !I/236/3/77-E 
As  far as  tho  trend of investment at Community  level is concerned  (cf.  graph 18, 
for trends in each individual  countr.y,  see  table  19),  the  chances of achieving 
the  rate assumed in outlook D (1980/75  :  5.0  ~ p.a.)  seem  even more  uncertain. 
The  weak  recovery in investment  in 1976  (+  3.2 %)  could still be  considered 
as being compatible  with the  growth path initially postulated.  The  weakness 
of this recovery is moreover linked to  the  very  low  growth,  or  indeed 
negative  gr~wth, in the  volume  of public  investment  in some  member  countries, 
r1hich  is,  of course,  a  reflection of the  public finance  situation,  but  which 
cannot nevertheless be  considered as being in line with what  is demanded 
by  the  economic  and employment  s'i  tuation. 
In this context it should be  underlined that in certain countries  of the 
Community,  both public and private investment  projects  alrea~ decided on  and 
for which  financing is assured are.being held back b.y  the behaviour of certain 
groups  in the population  (notably in the  energy sector and  in environmental 
protection). 
The  slowdown  in  gro~~h anticipated for 1977  means  a  further fall in the 
growth rate  of investment  in volume  tenns in the  short-term forecast 
(1977  :  + 1.3 fo).  According to the  "ideal" path,  1977  should have  been, 
on  the  contrary,  the year in which  the  trend of investment  sho~red a  real 
acceleration.  The  residual  rate for 1978,  1979  and 1980  (6.9% p.a.) 
in relation to outlook D (1980/75  :  5.0  '7~  p.a.) has no  chance  of being 
achieved unless  there is a  marked acceleration in the  growth1 of  GDP  in 
volume  terms.  The  last time  investment  growth rates close  to this residual 
rate  were  observed for three  consecutive years at Community  level was  1968 
(+  6.7  ;~),  1969  (+  1·4- '/o)  and  1970  (+  7.5 f,);  however,  during these  three 
years the  growth rate  of  GDP  in volume  terms was  5.3  %,  5·9  ;~  and 5.3  <fo 
respectively,  and the  degree  of capacity utilization \vas  distinctly higher 
than at present;  in addition,  taxes and parafiscal  charges and the  division 
between vJages  and profits were  more  favourable  to firms during this period. 
~·lhen the first forecasts  of fixed  inves:tment for 1978  - made  in Mey  1977 
assuming unchanged policies - are  taken into account,  the  volume  growth  of 
2.7  fo  for  the  Community  implies a  residual  growth for 1979  and 1980  of 9.0% 
p.a.  in order to achieve  the  projections of outlook D.  This rate  can be 
regarded as unrealistic. 
The  danger which thus threatens achievement  of ·the  investment  trend adopted 
in outlook D poses a  serious threat to both future  g-ro\·~h and  a  return to 
full employment  in the  Community  beyond 1980.  Insufficient  investment activity 
in the  present projection period would  to a  worrying extent  limit the nmnber 
of  jobs available  and the  scope  for growth in the years after 1980.  This 
document  can  only underline  the  arguments put  forward  in the  Fourth Progrrumne 
concerning the need to create new  jobs  through investment,  and the  conditions 
under which  investment activity can  be  revived  (see  points 115-119  of the - 28  - II/236/3/77-E 
Fourth Programme).  In view of the  investment  outlook described above,  concrete 
and  speedy  implementation of these  guidelines appears particularly 
important. 
2.  State  of progress in achieving the  Fourth Progrrunme  guidelines  on  growth; 
employment  problems. 
The  considerations outlined in the  preceding paragraph highlight  the  difficulties 
impeding achievement  of the  Fourth Programme  guidelines  on  growth. 
Real  GNP  growth of  4~% to 5 %  p.a.  in the  Community  for the  period 1976-80 
was  considered in the  Fourth Programme  as  a  minimum  which  had to be  attained, 
particularly in view of employment  problems.  A slightly higher growth rate 
of {e.g.) 5.1% p.a.  would,  under certain conditions,  have  cut  the  unemployment 
rate  by half between 1876  and  1980  (from  4.6 %  to 2.3 %  of the  working population -
cf. table 6).  Unless a  vigorous recovery.policy is achieved very rapidly, 
accompanied by strict discipline  (an ambitious prospect)  in the field of inflation 
and incomes,  together with solid financing of the  balance  of payments deficits 
thus created,  achieving an  objective  of 5 %  p.a.  would at present  seem 
to be  out  of reach. 
In view of the  estimates for  1976  (4.6 .%)  and the  forecasts for 1977  (3.0 %), 
*  the  residual  growth  rate necessary for 1978,  1979  and 1980 would  be  6 %  p.a. 
in order to achieve  the  target of 5.1 %  over the  period 1976-80.  A growth 
rate  of this order over three  consecutive years has never yet been achieved 
by  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
* If the  Commission's initial estimate for 1978  (3~ %)  is accepted,  the 
residual  rate for 1979  and  1980 becomes  7.2% p.a. - 29- II/236/3/77-E 
It seems  at present ver.y unlikely that the  Community  could achieve 
a  growth rate  of 4 3/4 %  p. a.  (i.e..  in the  middle  of the  4~- to 5  /o  range 
put  forward in the Programme)  for the  period 1976-80  unless additional 
economic  policy measures are  taken.  Even  the  lower limit  of ~%  p.a. 
will  be  difficult to achieve,  especially if account is taken of the first 
estimates for 1978. 
Despite  the  uncertainties of the  short-term forecasts  and  certain metho-
*  dological problems  ,  the  following conclusions  by  countr.y may  be  put 
forward  in the  light of the  residual rates for the  period 1978-80  (of.  table  20): 
it appears at present  almost  out  of the  question that the  United Kingdom, 
**  Italy and  Belgium  can achieve  growth equivalent to the  average 
guidelines of the  Fourth Programme; 
- in the  case  of Ireland,  the  revised projection is more  ambitious  than the 
programme t s  original  average  guideline  and is based principally on  "export-led" 
growth  and restraint of incomes; 
-in the  case  of France,  the Netherlands,  and Denmark,  achieving the  programme's 
average  guidelines poses  serious problems; 
Germany,  and  Luxembourg,  could possibly,  in favourable  conditions, still 
achieve  the  average  guideline,  put  forward  in the  programme. 
To  the  extent that the  Fourth Programme  guideline  on  growth is not  achieved, 




The  price  base  for constant  price  calculations is not  the  same  for all 
the  countries in the  medium-term projections and  short-term forecasts, 
and  this could influence  the  annual  growth rate  by  about  0.2 percentage 
points. 
'r.he  projection associated with the  Belgian national  plan contains a  lower 
growth assumption  (4. 2% instead of  4:~ - 5 %  p.a.  in the  Fourth Programme); 
moreover it has already been decided to  revise  ~he Belgian national plan. - 30- II/236/~/77  -E 
Already the  4 million unemployed  in the  Community  in 1980 estimated in the 
forecast  available  at present  (outlook D)  would  mean  failure  to achieve 
the  objective  of full employment.  If the  growth rate  were  3.5-4.0  fo  * 
(which the  short-term forecasts,  though still uncertain,  show  to be  quite 
plausible at present),  the number  of unemployed  in the  Community  could 
well rise  to or even exceed  6 million in 1980  (cf.  table  2la,  case  3  "Risk"), 
i.e. it would  be  about  1  million above  the  level anticipated for 1977. 
In this situation it may  be  asked to what  extent  the  number  of unemployed 
can be  reduced despite  the  poor outlook for  growth.  This  could be  achieved 
for example,  by  a  reduction in the activity rate.  Table  2la shows  that  a 
reduction in the  activity rate  of 0.6 points (cf. table  2la,  ttcase  2b"  compared 
with Outlook D,  case  2)  will,  ceteris paribus,  reduce  the  number  of unemployed 
in the  Community  in 1980  by  about li million.  Another way  in which  a  reduction 
in unemployment  could  be  achieved is by  slowing down  the  gro\~h of productivity 
per man.  To  reduce  the number  of unemployed  by  around  1~ million in 1980 
would  in this case  require  a  reduction in productivity growth  of 0.3 percentage 
points per annum  (cf.  table  2la,  case  2'a compared  with case  2).  However,  these 
mechanical  solutions would  be  very difficult to  achieve  and would  create 
numerous  problems. 
With  regard to activity rates, it has been  shown  in chapter II-1  (  page  5) 
that outlook D alrea~ assumes  a  low activity rate,  given  the  increase  in 
the  population of working age;  any further  reduction by  artificial,  non-
reversible  means  could pose  serious problems  in the  mid-1980's  when  the 
demographic  trends  swing round  the  other way. 
Measures  such as early retirement  or ra1s1ng the  school-leaving age  have  been 
introduced or are  envisaged in some  member  countries.  Hork  carried out  by the 
Economic  Policy Committee  has  shown  that  such measures  often have  beneficial 
social  consequences  (e.g.  reduction of the  retirement  age  for particularly 
arduous  occupatio~s~;· as regards  ~emp~oyment~ they can also ease  the  situation 
somewhat  (e.g.  ra1s1ng the  school-.Leavlng age),  but  do  no-t  provide  an  overall 
solution.  In the  same  context, it has  been  stressed that increased opportunities 
for part-time  work  could even create  a  new  demand  for  such  jobs;  in that event, 
the  activity rate  could well  increase. 
An  additional  reduction in the 
given that  the  growth rate  assumed 
* Cf.  page  26  of this report. 
difficult 
already - 31  - II/236/3/77-E 
at the  lower end of the  plausible  range  around the  prudent  assumption of 4 1o 
for the  underlying growth  of productivity per head.  Evidently,  in the  event 
of a  slower  medium~erm GNP  growth rate,  the  growth  of productivity per person 
employed could also be  slower,  given the  continuing effect of under-utilization 
of resource§;  hovrever  in this case,  since  growth would also be  slower there 
would  be  no  positive effect  on  employment  compared with  the  situation described 
in the  projections,  but  there  would  be  adverse effects in many  other areas 
( cf.  p.  7). 
On  the  other hand,  speeding up the  reduction in the  number  of annual  hours 
worked  could probably  have  a  positive effect,  though experience  has 
shown  that it is generally offset to  some  extent by  an additional  increase 
in hourly productivity.  The  number  of working hours per annum  has fallen qy 
an annual  average  of l%  during the  period 1960-75·  Continuing this trend 
to 1980  would mean  a  reduction of about  2  hours in the  working week,  or  an 
increase  of about  2  weeks  in annual  holidays.  Anticipating this trend, 
provided that  there  is no  global acceleration in wage  costs per unit  output, 
but  tru<ing account,  for certain countries,  of the  need to reduce  inequalities 
could have  a  positive effect  on  the  employment  situation.  Any  such arrangement 
would have  to be  governed by  collective agreements.  However,  even if it were 
introduced,  it would  be  of limited scope  :  attempting to go  too far  and too 
fast along such lines would raise  other serious problems.  Strictly limiting 
overtime  would  have  a  considerably less marked effect  on  employment,  and 
could well  affect the  flexibility of firms. 
It is worth recalling in this context that  a  reduction in the  rate  of 
activity does not  increase  the  wealth of the  population,  it merely shifts 
the  burden,  for example  f,rom  unemployment  benefits to  pensions.  B,y 
contrast,  a  slowdown  in productivity per person employed would mean  that, 
if inflationary effects \vere  to be  avoided,  there  would have  to  be  an 
equivalent  slowdown  in the  growth of real  incomes,  which would be  added  to the  rela-
li~ve  slowdown  already assumed by  the  projections due  to the  "normalisation" 
of the  corrected share  of wages  and salaries and firms  1  profit margins. 
Table  21  b  gives  some  mechanical  illustrations of the  effects of  the  different 
hypotheses for  growth and productivity used in table  2la on  the  1980 
level  of  GDP  and real per capita income. 
The  specific employment  measures mentioned above,apart  from  their positive 
social aspects,  pose  m~y problems and cannot  provide  an overall solution 
to  the  medium-term  problem  of unemployment.  Nevertheless the  outlook for 
employment  presented in this report  necessitates~1 accompanying employment 
policy in order to alleviate  the  situation as far as possible.  These 
accompanying measures  should also include,  wherever necessary,  some  strengthening 
of the more  classical measures  of education,  re-training and general  improve-
ment  of mobility. - 32  - II/236/3/77-E 
All these  cansiderationsmere~ confirm the  argument  put  forward in the 
Fourth Programme  that employment  problems must  be  solved basically 
through  steady growth.  Despite  the  disillusionment with growth which 
is evident in some  quarters,  the  objective  of pursuing a  further increase 
in material living standards is one  which  ~s also in line with the  wishes 
of the  ver,y  broad majority of the  population,  as  shown,  for example,  by 
the  continuing pressure for wage  and salar,y increases. - 33- II/236/3/77-E 
3.  Overcoming the obstacles to [rowth 
Quite apart  from  the psychological  discouragement  created  by an  increase or 
continuation in unemployment  and the pessimistic  forecasts  on  gro-vrth,  there 
are  a  number  of objective obstacles standing in the way  of gro-v1th  :  in par-
ticular  inflation,  which is still not under control,  ,:;.nci  the  balance  of 
payments  problems. 
These  two  phenomena  are closely linked  :  the high rates of inflation in certain 
countries have  contributed substantially to the  inequal distribution of external 
deficits.  Thus,  the balance  of payments  problems  resulting from  the oil price 
rise were made  more  difficult.  The  large  devalua~ion resulting from  external 
deficits  seem,  in certain cases,  to have  further accelerated inflation.  The 
defensive  reactions  in the  face  of this situation have  affected growth.  In-
versely the fear of once  again stimulating inflation ru1d/or  of causing  im-
portant  external deficits again after an  initial success of stabilization 
policies prevents  those  responsible  from  adopting a  clear policy in favour 
of growth. 
The  complexity of balance  of payments  and  inflationary problems  is connected 
with the fact,  pointed out  in the Fourth Programme,  that the world recession 
of 1974/75  was  both a  crisis of stabilization,  following a  long 
period of continuous acceleration in inflation,and a  crisis due  to the de-
flationary effects of the escalation in oil prices.  The  hesitant nature of 
economic  recovery and the mediocre  outlook for growth  show  that the solution 
to these problems  has  not  yet  been found. 
These: two  p:roblems  :P,ave  a  paM.i_?Uiar  dimension· today,  often not  -vmll' under-
stood,  in that they exist  at  the world level  and not  at the level of an  indivi-
dual  country or even of the  Community  alone. 
In so  far as  economic  policy fails to find solutions which take this dimension 
of the two  problems  into account,  its success would  be limited,  and psycholo-
gical discouragement  could produce negative  effects which  it would be difficult 
to  reverse  :under increased political pressure,  ad hoc,· specific measures, 
damaging to the  economy  as a  whole  and harmful  to future  development - 34- II/236/3 /77-E 
might  be  introduced;  the  rules of the  game  of the  economic  system would  be 
prevented from  operating properly,  recourse  to protectionist measures  would 
be  seen as an appropriate  course  of action,  and the  result might  well  be 
even less growth and even more  unemployment,  not  to mention the  political 
consequences at international and domestic level. 
,The  f,ight  against  inflatiqn remains  a  major task of economic  policy. 
As  regards inflation there  is no  miracle  cure.  It.is undoubtedly necessary 
to fight  steadily against the  structural causes.  But  these  alone  are not 
sufficient to explain the  size  of the  acceleration of inflation and  the  degree 
of divergence  between inflation rates which has been observed vrithin the 
Community  in recent years.  An  important  part  of the  struggle  against inflation 
must  therefore  continue  to  be  concentrated on  instruments for  overall manage-
ment  of the  economy,  especially control  of the  growth  of liquidity and  the 
correct alignment  of the  public authorities•  borroHing requirement with 
macroeconomic equilibria.  At  the  same  time,  the  gro\rlh  of nominal  incomes 
should contribute  to  the  achievement  of greater price  stability within the 
macroeconomic  framework  thus established. Uncontrolled growth of nominal 
incomes unrelated to the  real  growth  of social welfare  does not  resolve 
the  problems  of  income  distribution and  can  only increase  the  difficulty of 
getting back to satisfactor,y growth and full employment. 
There  is no need here  to  go  into  the  use  of these  instruments in detail. The 
example  given by  a  number  of conntries within and outside  the  Community  which 
have  successfully controlled inflation over recent years,  shows  that  these 
instrrunents are  still as  important  as ever.  vJhat  is necessary,  especially 
in the  countries which  have  not yet been able  to  reduce  sufficiently their 
inflation rates,  is to apply those  instruments effectively,  together with 
restraint in the  growth  of nominal  incomes.  1~e precise mix of  instruments 
is of course  also a  question of social  consensus and  the  general political 
situation (of.  page  10) •  'l
1o  the  extent that  the  social  consensus makes it 
possible  to  operate  a  wealth policy,  this could make  an  important  contribution 
to the  solution of the  problems of  income  distribution vihich,  viithout  rebuilding 
inflation,  would  be  compatible  with  growth and  the  return to full employment. 
In view of v1hat  -vms  stated in paragraph l  of this chapter,  dealing with the 
conjunctural economic  growth  path  (bf.  page~), the  ti.me  available  to achieve 
this stabilization no  longer  seems  ver,y  great. If this time  is not used,  this 
would mean  the  failure  of the  strategy contained in the  Fourth Progr~mne, 
and the  Community  would  be  in danger  of embarking on  a  prolonged period of 
*  low grov1th  ,  high unemployrnen·!;  and continuing inflation. 
* Medium-term  grol-rth  could vrell  be  substantially belo-v.;  4%  a  year,  whereas 
at least  4~· %  a  year would  be  needed to stabilize  and begin to  reduce 
the  unemployment  (cf.  page 8). - 35-
As  mentioned  above,  the  divergence  in balance  of payments  situations  and  outlooks 
(cf.  pages  15 et  seq,  particularly page 18),  is obviously closely linked to the 
divergences  in the fields  of economic policy,  cost  and price trends  and  exchange 
rates.  However,  this problem  is made  particularly complicated by the fact  of the 
oil-exporting countries'surplus,  which will continue for several years,  and the 
inevitable corresponding deficit  on  the part  of the oil-importing countries  as 
a  whole. 
The  persistent  current  account  surylus of the  OPEC  countries has  altered the 
balance  of payments  equilibrium norm  for the oil-importing countries.  For the 
industrialised countries  as  a  v;hole,  in view of their deficit  -v;i th OP~'C,  the 
norm  is no  longer to achieve  balance  of payments equilibrium or a  s1ight  surplus 
(so as to be  able  to provide  capital aid for the  developing countries). 
In purely theoretical terms,  it is possible to develop new  norms  corresponding for 
example to the  old norms  minus  the  "oil effect" v1hich  the area or country in 
question has to cope  with;  this would mean  that  each  economic  area in the world 
and  where  appropriate,  though  v1ith  certain qualifications,  each  country \-:auld 
finance  its "oil deficit".  Chapt'er II,  paragraph 3  shoHed  that  in practice the 
problem is much  more  complex than that. 
Nevertheless,  these  considerations,  although unrealistic,  may  be taken as  a 
po1n~ of departure.  If it was  possible for the  Corr~unity to act  as  an  economic 
unit,  one  might  conceivably envisage it managing to achieve · sustaine~ grm·rtl1, 
while at the  same  time  accepting an external deficit  corresponding to its oil 
deficit.  The  Community  has  sufficient credit with the  surplus  countries  (who 
themselves \·Jould  be  looking for safe  investments _for  their capital)  to be  able 
to  finance this deficit without difficulty for the  few  years  in question.  Thus 
the balance of payments  problem,  in so _far  as  it is the result of the  OPEC 
surplus,  would  cease to be  an obstacle to growth. 
A policy of this sort  would not  be  inflationary in itself.  The  external deficit 
would  in the end ·be  financed by  the  oil countries'  savings~ These  savings 
would  find their natural  domestic  counterpart  in a  public deficit  associated 
vri th the policy of supporting growth  and  subsequently in the borroHing require-
ment  of firms,  which would  be  increased by the  recovery in investment  activity. 
Obviously,  the  effects of this  on the trend of monetary aggregates  and the 
potential  margi~ of price  increases  ~ust be taken  into consideration.  This policy, 
v-Jhile  cvrrtributing to  growth  Find  to a  return to full  employment  8,t  domestic  level·, 
v1ould  reduce  gro-v.rth  and_ debt  problems  nnd in t-he  end,  other political uroblemR  at  . , 
· -vwrld  level. l(urthermore,  an  increase  in development  aid from  the  OPEC  countries  P.n~ro 
industrialized countries,  including the Community,  could also stimulate exports 
of goods  and services  from  the Community  and thus  also help to restore full 
employment. 
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Putting such  a  solution into practice  comes  up not  only against 
the  lack of unity of the  Community,  but  in particular against the  difference 
between.  member  countries in their success in controlling inflation. 
Greater  convergence  to-v1ards  stability in member  co1ll1tries'  cost and price 
trends is therefore,  from  this viewpoint  too,  an essential precondition for 
achieving a  return to  growth  and full employment. 
The  Community  is thenfore  faced with the  problem  of achieving convergence 
towards  cost and  price  stability while  at the  same  time  taking account  of  the 
fundamental  change  which  has  taken place  in the  world balance  of  payments 
situation.  Given  the  disquieting outlook  f~r growth  and unemployment,  the 
conditions for  implementing a  Community  policy designed to achieve  a  return 
to adequate  growth  should be  formulated now,  a  policy which  would not run 
counter to the efforts directed towards  stabilization and  convergence  and 
one  which  would allow financing of the  external deficits which are  inevitably 
due  to  the  situation at world level.  The  main  conditions for this purpose 
may  be  summed  up  in seven points  : 
The  effective application of the  criteria for adjusting the  conjunctural time-
path according to the  situation of the  ·various countries,  as  outlined in 
paragraph  l  of this chapter,  would  represent  an  important first sten in 
this direction.  In effect,  the  countries in the  most  favourable  position 
as regards prices and the  balance  of  payments  should continue  to  lead growth 
inside  the  Community,  while  the  countries who  hrrve  not yet  sufficiently 
reduced their irfl.ation rate  should bring inflation  rapidly under control  so  that 
they can  subsequently take  up  the  running  in sustaining growth.  Although 
this scenario was  follovred  in 1976,  notably in Crermany,  the  latest available 
short-term forecasts  show  that it is no  longer being followed,  or is being 
followed vli th groHth rates that  are  too  low  and  inflation rates that are  too 
high;  this situation must  therefore  be  rectified.  The  Study  Group  considers 
that very little time  remains  to  do  this  (cf.  page  26). 
A second a.snect  is connected with exchange  rate policy:  the  large fall in 
the  value  of certain currencies has  perhaps helped  solve  some  of the  problems 
of the  countries concerned,  but has also contributed to  the  acceleration in 
inflation \'Thich  has  sharpened the  conflict over  shares in national  income 
and  the  divergences within the  Community  (of.  chapter II, page  13).  'l"'he 
lesson to be  learned here  is not  only that these  countries must  stabilize 
their domestic  situation,  but  also that  inevitable balo.nce  of payments 
deficits must  be  covered by medium-term  financing,  subject to the  condition 
that  the  vicious circle  of devaluation,  inflation and  increased struffgles 
for  shares of national  income  is broken. - 37- II/236/3./77-E 
The  third as;:ec  .. t  concerns  those  countries which,  in a  situation v1here  e.n 
external deficit uould be  the  "theoretical normal"  situation,  have  maintained 
external equilibrimn or even  a  surplus through better control  of inflation. 
Tnese  countries have  a  particular role  to play  :  they are  creditors not  only 
because  of their mm surplus,  but also because,  for reasons of safety,  oil 
money  has  and will  continue  to have  a  tendency to  seek  investment in their 
currencies.  Thus  these  countries can formulate  the  economic policy conditions 
linked to this credit.  But  they also have  the  responsibility of pursuing 
firmly and for as long as possible  the  policy of achieving sustained growth 
in conditions of stability in line with the  conjun.ctural  time-path criteria 
already referred to. 
1fuis v.rould  mean  that their balances of payments  would 
continue  to move  towards  a  more  balanced situation and  the  problem of sharing 
oil deficits would  be  made  easier. 
The  policy of pursuing sustained growth in conditions of stability vlOuld  not 
increase  the  OP~ surplus  too much,  but it would enable  the  Community  to 
contribute  to alleviating world balance  of payments  problems.  In view of the 
continuing OPEC  surplus,  the  Community  as a  whole  could over the  coming years 
accept  an external deficit and,  in 1980,  could move  towards  current account 
equilibrium rather than the  large  surplus  shown  in the  projections.  Such  a 
development  would  be  entirely in  line  with the  macroeconomic  context,  but 
would necessitate  (fourth asnect)  recourse  to adequate  means  of financing. 
Community  assistance might  be  envisaged through development  of the  Corrnnunity's 
financial  instruments,  for example  through loans floated  on  the  international canital 
markets.  The  money  thus collected could be  used for example  to promote  investment 
and structural  develupment  in the  Community  in ways  to be  defin.ed  by  the 
responsible  authorities. If the  Community  were  to  pruvide  overall assistance 
in financing external deficits, it would  have  to  be  given tre power  to·, 
enfore  economic  policy conditions which  are  binding, 
. but at the  same  time  compatible  with the  overall  concept  of the 
policy aimed at achieving sustained growth  in conditions of stability. 
If growth  support  policy is not  to rekindle  inflation by boosting the  growth 
of nominal  incomes,  there  must  be  (fifth aspect)  serious discussions,  for 
example  in the  existing institutional framework  of the  "Tripartite Conferences", 
between  the  Community  institutions,  the  governments of the  J.iember  States and 
the  two  sides of  industry  on  the  dangerous  outlook for  growth and unemployment 
and  on  the  possibilities for a  solution.  A discussion of this kind must  amount 
to more  than a  simple  appeal for moderation,  and must  clearly  show  the  link 
between nominal  incomes,  prices and costs and the  room  for manoeuvre  available 
for  a  policy of growth  and  convergence  towards  stability,  opening up  the 
possibility of  an  increase  in employment  and  a  medium-term  growth of real 
income  faster than under any  other solution.  The  discussion  should also cover 
the  aspects  of'  specific employment  policy as well  as,  for  some  countries,  the 
problem of reducing inequalities. - 38- II/236/3./77-E 
In order to promote  the  medium-term  restructuring of the use  of resources as 
described in the  Fourth Progrrunme  and referred to again in this report,  the 
policy of pursuing sustained growth in conditions of stability should in the 
main be  basen  on  stimulation of investment,  although in certain oases private 
consumption  could also make  a  contribution  (cf.  page  20).  This  sixth aspect 
means  that  there  must  be  support  for private  and public  investment  activity. 
The  objective,  clearly,  remains  to develop private  investment  by  creating a 
climate  of confidence  and by achieving the  necessary conditions to ensure 
sufficient  demand  and profitability.  But  in the  present  situation it is 
necessary to  stimulate  public  investment  to help attain the  objective.  In 
some  countries public investment has  been restrained by an appreciable 
omount  in the  recession,  in others it is noticeably lagging behind.  The 
effect  on  the  public sector deficit of such  a  programme  coulci  be  alleviated 
by  a  reorganization of public  spending and by  the  growth of revenue  that  will 
occur when  the  rate  of grovnh of output  returns  t~ a  more  satisfactory level. 
An  increase  in public  investment  t-Tould  also  have  the  advantage  of being to 
a  large extent  reversible -although maintenance  costs are  permanent  - and 
would  thus be  less in contradiction with the  medium-term reorganization of 
public finance.  Moreover,  a  less rapid reduction of the  public  sector deficits 
would be  compatible  with the  balnnce  of payments  outlook and would  thus fit 
into the  pattern of sectoral financial  balances lvi thout  generating inflation. 
The  final  aspect  to  be  stressed is that  a  policy of sustained growth in 
conditivns  of stability should pay equal  attention to the  problems  of the 
next  fev.r  years and  to  the  outlook beyond 1980.  'I'he  employment  situation 
will remain difficult for  a  few years yet;  a  strengthening of accompanying 
employment  policies is therefore  indispensable,  in order to relieve  the 
situation while  the  under-emplo~nent is being gradually eliminated by  growth. 
The  s-tructural aspects of the  present  situation and  of  the  medium  and  long-
term  developments  should be  studied more  closely.  In this context it must 
be  remembered.  that  investment  in the  corning years  should take  account  of the 
need to economize  energy and recycle  scarce  resoQrces,  and that  the  develop-
ment  of alternative energy  sources,  the  adaptation of productive  capacity 
to  the  outlook for the  international division of labour,  the  fight  against 
pollution and the  preservation of the natural environment  as well  as the 
cleaning of the  large  urban agglomerations are  areas which require  further 
attention and which take  a  large  amount  of investment. 
* 
*  * 
On  the  basis of these  considerations,  it 'tvould  be  possible  to  work  out  the 
broad lines of a  plan for  sustained,  vigorous  ~rowth and Commm1ity  convergence 
towards price  stability,  which,  on the  basis of existing projections,  would 
be  compatible  with the  re-establishment  of macroeconomic equilibria.  Thus, 
an effort could be  made  to follow,  at least,  partially,  the  quantitative 
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 TABL~AU  Variations bilateralea dee  couts  et  dee  taux  de  change 
TABEL!.E  23  Bilaterale Veranderungen  der Kosten  und  Wechselkuree 
TABLE  Bilateral changes  in costa  and  exchange  rates 
..  Indices 1976/1966 
""'  .  p  l  A.ys  c:.-npr  s 
Folgenc.c  L3nder 
D  ?ollow.  countr.~  F  I  NL  B  L  UK  IRL  DK 
par rapport a 
im  Verhaltnis  zu  . 
in rela.t;ion  to  J, 
l. Variation  des  couts ealariaux par· unite  produite (en  monnaies 
nationalee)  - Veranderung  der  LohnkoeteA  je Produkteinheit  (in 
nationaler Wahrung  - Changes  in wage  costa per unit of output 
(national  currency) 
D  - 124,5 158,9 123,6 117, If  133,5 167,1  167,3 134,0 
F  80,3  - 127,6  99,3  94,2  107,2 134,2 134,4 10?,6 
I  63,0  78,4  77,8  73,9  84,0 105,2  105,3  84,3  - NL  81,0 100,8  128,5  95,0 108,0 135,2 135,4  108,4  - B  85,2 106,1 135,4 105,3  113,8 142,4 142,6 114,2  - L  74,9  93,3 119,0  92,6  87,7  - 125,2 125,3 100,4 
UK  59,9  74,5  95,1  74,0  ?0,2  79,9  - 100,1  80,2 
IRL  59,8  74,4  95,0  73,9  70,2  79,8  99,9  - 80,1 
DK  74,6  93.0 118,6  92.3  87,6  99.7  124,7 124.9  -
2.  Variation  des  taux  de  changes 
Veranderung  der Wechselkurse  (12.1976/ ¢  1966) 
Changes  in exchange-rates 
D  - 58,3  42,4  85., 2  81,1  81,1  35,3  35,3  69,1 
F  171,5  - 72,7  153,3 139,0 139,0  60,5  60,5  118,4 
I  235,8  137,5  - 211,8  191,2 191,2  83,2  83,2  162,8 
NL  117,4  65,3  4?,2  - 90,7  90,7  39,5  39,5  77,3 
B  123,3  71,9  52,3 110,2 G  - 100,0  43,5  43,5  85,2 
L  123,3  71,9  52,3 110,2 100,0  - 43,5  43,5  85,2 
UK  283,5  165,4 120,2 253,4  229,9  229,9  - 100,0 195,8 
IRL  283,5  165,4 120,2 253,4  339,9  229,9  100,0  - 195,8 
DK  144.8  84,5  61.4  129.4 11?.4 11?.4  51.1  51,1  -
3.  Effet  total 
\ 
Gesamtwirkung  (=  lx2) 
Overall  effect 
D  - 72,6  67,4 105,3  95,2 108,3  58,9  59,0  92,5 
F  137,7  - 92,8  152,1 131,0 149,1  81,1  81,3 127,4 
I  148,4  107,8  - 164,8 14113  160,7  8?,5  87,6  137,3 
NL  95,0  65,7  60,?  - 86,1  98,0  53,4  53,4  83,7 
B  105,1  76,3  ?0,8 116,1  - 113,8  61,9  62,0  97,2 
L  92,4  67,1  62,2  102,0  87,7  - 54,4  54,5  85,5 
UK  169,7  123,2  114,3 187,4  161,5 1R3,7  - 100,1  157,0 
IRL  169,5 123,1  114,2  187,2 161,3 183,5  99,9  - 156,7 
DK  108.1  7R.5  72.8  119.4  102.9  117.0  63,7  63,8  -
1\) 
\  co 
I  . 
Sources  -~ell~  196~-1975:  Co.mptea  nationaux  SEC  Agregate  Annuaire  1976  -
Volkswirtschaftl.Gesamtrechnungen  ESVG  Jahrbuch  1976  - National  Accounts 
ESA  Aggregates  Yearbook  1976  - Ireland  lq66-70:  Comptee  nationaux  Agregate 
1973  - Volkswirtschaft1.  Gesamtrechnungen  ESVG  1973  - National  Accounte  . 
Agcregatee  1973  - 1976:  Budgets  economiques  - Wirtscha!tsbudgets  - Econ6mlc
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A 4 210r297 mm 0 
MADE  IN  GERMANY / 
75 A 4  210x297 mm  MADE  IN  GERMANY .~· 
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